European Union Expansion, Corruption, and the Rule of Law

Why does European Union (EU) enlargement produce deep institutional reform in some countries, yet cosmetic compliance and persistent corruption in others? How can the same accession rules strengthen democratic governance in one context while entrenching patronage in another? This course is built around this central puzzle: when and why does EU enlargement work as a tool of political and economic transformation and when does it fail? Focusing on the western Balkans, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, students examine how accession conditionality, regulatory harmonization, and financial incentives reshape domestic political coalitions and reform incentives.

The course treats the EU not as a neutral administrator, but as a strategic actor deploying legal, financial, and normative instruments to influence state behavior.

Students examine how these tools interact with elite interests, informal networks, and institutional capacity, producing divergent reform trajectories.

Drawing on contemporary research, EU policy documents, and comparative case studies, students learn to interpret accession frameworks and rule-of-law benchmarks as political instruments rather than technical checklists.

By the end of the course, students are able to explain variation in reform outcomes and to apply these insights to careers in public policy, development, law, and journalism.